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CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT’S RARE INTERPRETATION OF
THE FCPA IN UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS AND
ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
MORGAN R. KNUDTSEN∗
ABSTRACT
The scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is
inherently difficult to ascertain. Over time, the SEC and DOJ have
privately settled claims under the FCPA, leaving most interpretation to government agencies. Though agency interpretation happens
frequently, there has been little interpretation over major questions
such as who is subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction and how far that
jurisdiction extends. United States v. Hoskins, which was decided
in August 2018, involved the FCPA, conspiracy, and foreign corporate officials. The Second Circuit in its decision subsequently
limited the scope of the FCPA, holding that liability cannot extend
to foreign persons who have never set foot in the United States or
who do not fit within the categories set forth within the statute.
Hoskins, a case of statutory interpretation, leaves many holes in our
understanding of FCPA compliance and enforcement. This Note
seeks to determine the implications the Second Circuit’s decision
will have for future courts and defendants.


JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2020; BA in Political
Science, University at Albany, Class of 2017; BS in Economics, University at
Albany, Class of 2017. The author would like to thank her parents for their
love and support throughout her academic pursuits. Ms. Knudtsen would also
like to thank the William & Mary Business Law Review staff and editorial boards
for their assistance in preparing this Note for publication.
∗

771

772 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:771
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 773
I. CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT—THE
FOUNDATION FOR HOSKINS ...................................................... 774
A. The Gebardi Principle: A Springboard Exception to
Accomplice Liability ............................................................ 775
B. Gebardi in Application: Conflicting Interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding ...................................... 778
1. United States v. Amen: The Drug Kingpin Statute ...... 778
2. Ocasio v. United States .................................................. 780
II. HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ............. 782
A. Key Amendments to the FCPA: Extending Its Jurisdictional
Reach ................................................................................... 783
B. A History of FCPA Enforcement........................................ 786
C. Precedent, Conspiracy, and the FCPA: United States v.
Castle ................................................................................... 789
III. UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS ................................................. 791
A. History and District Court Opinion .................................. 791
B. Second Circuit’s Affirmation ............................................. 793
C. Application of Precedent to United States v. Hoskins...... 795
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULING ................ 799
A. Potential for Circuit Splits and Potential Congressional
Action ................................................................................... 799
B. The Implications of Hoskins on Attaching Agency Theory to
Foreign Officials.................................................................. 805
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 809

2020]

CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA

773

INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or The Act) was
the product of years of uncovered corporate corruption and bribery
in the United States.1 Codified as part of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the FCPA contains anti-bribery provisions, which prohibit individuals from seeking favorable business opportunities
by offering things of value to foreign officials.2 Almost inevitably,
the government implemented the FCPA to require corporations
to monitor their employees, comply with government standards,
and prevent the bribery of foreign officials.3 As written, the statute
addresses a class of persons that must comply with its command,
seemingly identifying who can be liable for violating the FCPA.4
However, though passed in the wake of Watergate, there remains
a void in our understanding of the FCPA’s reach, making the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hoskins a stepping-stone
to greater understanding of the law.5
Hoskins questioned the limits of the FCPA’s jurisdictional
reach in addressing whether conspiracy liability may attach to
individuals who have never stepped foot in the United States but
have communicated with a U.S. corporation for the purpose of bribing foreign officials.6 At the time of writing, the Hoskins story is
seemingly complete, as the United States has declined to seek certiorari. The Second Circuit announced its decision in August 2018,
offering an exceptional judicial interpretation of the FCPA and
seemingly limiting the government’s fairly expansive reading of
FCPA liability.7 Given the Circuit’s restriction on the government’s
reach, this Note considers the unique position the government now
faces in future FCPA prosecutions.


1 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 230 (1997).
2 Taylor J. Phillips, The Federal Common Law of Successor Liability and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (2015).
3 Salbu, supra note 1, at 230–31.
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1976).
5 See Ezekiel K. Rediker, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Judicial Review, Jurisdiction, and the “Culture of Settlement,” 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53,
54 (2015).
6 See generally United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
7 Christian R. Martinez, Note, The Curious Case of Lawrence Hoskins: Evaluating the Scope of Agency Under the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA, 53
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 211, 212, 214 (2020).
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Notably, Hoskins renders a decision not only on the FCPA,
but also on our understanding of conspiracy liability.8 In light of the
Second Circuit’s decision, this Note begins with a brief overview
of conspiracy liability as it has been interpreted across various courts.
Part II then considers the unusual position the Second Circuit
was in to consider the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach by briefly considering the historical background of the FCPA. Before concluding
in Part IV, Part III shifts to demonstrate the Hoskins decision
particularly focusing on how the Second Circuit used preexisting
case law to establish its unique holding. Finally, in Part IV, this Note
considers the practical side effects of Hoskins, its implications,
and whether agency liability can—and will—attach to foreign individuals such as Mr. Hoskins in future litigation.
I.CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT—
THE FOUNDATION FOR HOSKINS
Conspiracy liability is not a blanket rule that attaches to all
individuals regardless of the underlying offense.9 Rather, there
are inextricable common law exceptions to criminal liability that
are often tied to legislative intent.10 The following discussions offer valuable insight into the history of the inquiry addressed in
Hoskins. Importantly, these cases have laid the foundation for the
Second Circuit to ascertain just how conspiracy liability and legislative intent work together to establish whether a statute can
be extended to an unnamed class of individuals.11 As a necessary
precondition, this Note considers the logic set forth in these cases
to make sense of the Second Circuit’s holding. Subsequently, in
Part III, this Note will consider how these cases uniquely shaped
the Second Circuit’s decision, why the Second Circuit found Mr.
Hoskins was not liable under the FCPA, and how the court arguably
extended the narrow exception set forth by the Supreme Court in
Gebardi v. United States.12

See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 76–77.
See Shu-en Wee, Note, The Gebardi “Principles,” 117 COLUM. L. REV. 115,
116 (2017).
10 Id. at 119.
11 Compare id., with Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80–81.
12 See infra Part III.
8
9

2020]

CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA

775

A.The Gebardi Principle: A Springboard Exception to Accomplice
Liability
The leading case on conspiracy liability is the Supreme Court’s
1932 decision in Gebardi v. United States.13 Historically, Gebardi
was decided at a time when strict application of the conspiracy
statute led to jarring results.14 Chiefly, the Supreme Court was concerned with the fundamental irregularities that existed where a statute would expressly protect a certain class of persons, but where
the federal conspiracy statute would subsequently hold that same
class of individuals liable for the underlying crime.15 Consequently,
the Court crafted a unique exception to conspiracy liability that
protects against liability if a statute neglects to name a specific
class of persons as a necessary component to the commission of
the crime.16
At issue in Gebardi was the Mann Act, a federal law prohibiting the transportation of women for the purpose of sexual intercourse in interstate commerce, notwithstanding a woman’s consent
to the act.17 The Gebardi petitioners allegedly conspired to transport a woman across state lines in violation of the Mann Act.18
One of the named petitioners, however, was the woman transported.19 Thus, the question before the Court was whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the woman’s conviction under
a theory that she too conspired to commit the crime.20 The Court
understood the fundamental irregularities set forth by the conspiracy statute and, in evaluating the statute’s text and the specific legislative intent at issue, declined to hold the woman liable
for her participation in the crime.21
The Court heavily relied on the statute’s text, stating that
the Act failed to condemn a woman for her consent to participate in

See Wee, supra note 9, at 116.
See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 115 (1932).
15 See id. at 123.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 118–20.
18 Id. at 115–16.
19 Id. at 116.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 123.
13
14
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the crime.22 Perhaps most importantly, the Court noted an underlying affirmative legislative policy to leave the woman free from
liability.23 The Court articulated that the Mann Act was not intended to punish a woman for “transporting herself” across state
lines and, at the very least, liability could only attach if the
woman helped another to transport herself.24 Instead, Congress
designed the Mann Act to punish only those who actually sought
to violate the law.25 The Court refused to extend liability to a
woman who merely acquiesced to the principal’s violation.26
The key to understanding Gebardi and its subsequent cases
requires careful consideration of statutory interpretation as the
foundation for legislative intent. The Court first determined the plain
language of the Mann Act supports its conclusion that Congress
intended only for the Mann Act to hold those that “transport” liable,
instead of those that merely participate.27 The statutory language
created an underlying presumption that Congress intended to
reach only a specific class of individuals.28 In expressly identifying
who is liable for violations of the Mann Act, Congress implicitly
and intentionally immunized all other classes of individuals by
choosing not to name them in the statute.29 Immunization, however,
is not absolute.30 The law may hold an unidentified class liable
where application of the conspiracy statute does not contravene
Congress’s underlying legislative policy.31
The principle set forth in Gebardi is arguably a rather narrow rule that seems to rely on the inherent differences between

Id.
Id.
24 Id. at 118–19 (quoting United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915)).
25 Id. at 119–21, 123.
26 Id. at 123. The Court’s reasoning in Gebardi is consistently applied in
cases where individuals are found to be the victims of the underlying crime. For
example, in cases of statutory rape, courts will routinely decline to hold the
underage person liable for the crime as an accomplice or co-conspirator, even
if they were active and willing participants. The logic evidently stems from
Gebardi but may also stem from a societal principle that the laws should not
aim to punish those the laws deem victims of the alleged crime.
27 Id. at 118–19.
28 Id. at 119.
29 Wee, supra note 9, at 116, 123–24.
30 Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
31 Id.
22
23
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statutes.32 Constructing statutes requires an “affirmative congressional intent” to include or exclude certain classes from the
law’s reach.33 With respect to the Mann Act, the Court reasoned
that conspiracy to violate this specific kind of statute required
more than consent to the principal’s conduct, and instead required active participation.34 The Court did not look to specific
floor statements or to the law’s codified purpose, but instead
looked to the specific text and the woman’s actual role in the commission of the crime.35
As it stands, Gebardi authored a narrow, two-pronged assessment for conspiracy liability. First, the statute must criminalize
some action taken by an individual whose consent is an “inseparable incident” that merges with the underlying crime,36 but whom
the statute does not expressly punish.37 Having established this
prong, a court must then consider whether there is more than
mere consent to commit the alleged crime.38 Gebardi thus served
as a starting point for later conspiracy cases by establishing that
the fundamental presumption of immunity from conspiracy liability will only apply where the underlying offense both requires
the named party to participate in the offense and where that party
is not a class subject to liability in the underlying statute.39

See id. For example, a law prohibiting bankruptcy fraud could result in
the imposition of conspiracy liability, because there does not appear to be a
“victimized” participant—all individuals would seem to participate in the crime
and the law does not aim to protect individuals that participate. See id. The
Mann Act, however, does not allow for conspiracy liability because the Act specifically aims to protect the woman transported for the commission of the
crime. Id.
33 See id.
34 Jack C. Smith, Note, Grappling with Gebardi: Paring Back an Overgrown
Exception to Conspiracy Liability, 69 DUKE L.J. 465, 475–76 (2019).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 480.
37 Id. at 477; see also Wee, supra note 9, at 123–24.
38 Smith, supra note 34, at 477; see also Wee, supra note 9, at 123. The Court
suggested that a woman may be liable for violations of the Mann Act if she was
the “moving spirit” of the crime. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 117. This seems to suggest that the woman must actively suggest the cross-border trip, finance the
means to travel across state lines, or perhaps blackmail another into violating
the law. See id.
39 Wee, supra note 9, at 121.
32
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B.Gebardi in Application: Conflicting Interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding
1.United States v. Amen: The Drug Kingpin Statute
Prior to rendering its decision in Hoskins, the Second Circuit
addressed Gebardi and conspiracy liability in relation to longstanding criminal enterprises.40 At issue in Amen was the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (“the Drug Kingpin Statute”),
which subjects high officials of drug organizations to a maximum
of life imprisonment for serving as the kingpin of an organization.41 The key question before the court was whether a person
could be liable for conspiring with the kingpin of the enterprise;
it held that nonemployees of a continuing criminal enterprise
“could never conspire to violate” the statute.42
The case before the court involved a nonemployee who not only
communicated with the kingpin’s subordinates but also performed
acts for the kingpin.43 The statute, as written, did not directly apply to the “employees” or nonemployees of a drug enterprise.44 The
government conceded this point but considered the fundamental
differences between employees and nonemployees.45 The government maintained that a nonemployee could “knowingly provide
direct assistance” to the kingpin and, consequently, should be guilty
as a co-conspirator to the crime.46
The Second Circuit, however, in relying on an expanded
version of the Gebardi principles, held that the government did
not have sufficient legislative history to support its interpretation.47 The Circuit read Gebardi to suggest that congressional
identification of a liable party necessarily implies the exclusion of
all others from liability for the underlying offense.48 In particular,
the Drug Kingpin Statute contemplates liability for “top brass”

See generally United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 375–76 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 34, at 478. A drug kingpin has at least five
subordinates and leads the drug organization. Id. at 478.
42 Smith, supra note 34, at 479; see also Amen, 831 F.2d at 381.
43 Amen, 831 F.2d at 377.
44 Id. at 381.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 381–82.
47 Id. at 382.
48 Smith, supra note 34, at 479.
40
41
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leaders, rather than “lieutenants and foot soldiers.”49 Because the
statute suggests that only these individuals may be guilty for violating the law, nonemployees could not possibly be considered
liable for aiding and abetting the kingpins.50
The concept of ordinary or plain meaning of the text, relevant legislative history, and substantive canons of construction
tend to guide statutory interpretation, and did so in this case.51
The Second Circuit heavily relied on the legislative history of the
Drug Kingpin Statute to identify the affirmative policy set forth
by Congress.52 The court first concluded that Congress only intended to “target ringleaders of large-scale” operations, based on
the statutory text alone.53 More importantly, the court determined that Congress failed to mention aiding and abetting in the
kingpin statute and specifically expressed that the statute was
not intended to “catch” aiders and abettors.54 While it is not necessary for Congress to include an aiding and abetting provision
for liability to attach based on the nature of the federal conspiracy
statute, the substantive canons of statutory interpretation dictated the court’s understanding of statutory intent.55
The Second Circuit’s interpretation arguably finds similar
credence in the traditional rule of lenity, which asks the court to
interpret statutory ambiguities in favor of the defendant.56 The
Amen court, however, expanded the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gebardi by requiring Congress to fully disclose all liable parties
within the statute or else fully relinquish the government’s ability
to prosecute aiders and abettors through the federal conspiracy
statute.57 This conclusion is surely inapposite to Gebardi, in which
the Supreme Court anticipated that a woman could be liable for
violations of the Mann Act in specific circumstances despite the


Amen, 831 F.2d at 381 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773,
781 (1985)).
50 Id.
51 See Smith, supra note 34, at 469; Wee, supra note 9, at 125–26.
52 Bridget Maloney, Comment, United States v. Amen: Aiding and Abetting
Kingpins, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 503–04 (1998).
53 Id. at 503; Amen, 831 F.2d at 381.
54 Maloney, supra note 52, at 503; see Amen, 831 F.2d at 381 (citing H.R.
1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4569).
55 See Maloney, supra note 52, at 511–12.
56 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 698 (5th ed. 2016).
57 Amen, 831 F.2d at 381–82.
49
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statute’s silence.58 The Second Circuit’s early decision to expand
Gebardi to a wholesale implication of intent from silence perhaps
misinterprets the Supreme Court’s precedent and laid the foundation for the 2018 Hoskins decision.
2.Ocasio v. United States
More recently, in 2016, the Supreme Court decided a case
relating to the “age-old principles of conspiracy” and violations of
the Hobbs Act.59 Perplexingly, the Court questioned whether a
public official could conspire with shop owners to extort themselves.60 Ocasio challenged his conspiracy conviction, alleging he
could not conspire with individuals who voluntarily offered payment for referrals to their businesses.61 Curiously, in relying on
principles set forth in Gebardi, the Court held that the shop owners were capable of conspiring to extort themselves and, therefore,
Ocasio was also liable under the federal conspiracy statute.62
In rendering its decision, the Court explained that the government need not prove individual intent to commit the underlying
offense.63 Co-conspirators may come to an agreement where only one
person commits the offense while the other provides support.64 Even
in such a case, the latter party is “as guilty as the perpetrators.”65

Compare id., with Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932).
Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016); see also Michael F.
Dearington, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s Sudden Expansion
of Conspiracy Liability (And Why Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should Take
Note), 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 204, 205 (2017).
60 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1427–28. Ocasio, the shop owners, and nine other
officers were charged with violations of the Hobbs Act and conspiracy to violate
the Hobbs Act. Id. The underlying scheme involved the police officers directing
damaged vehicles to the shop in exchange for kickbacks for the referral. Id.
61 Sigourney Haylock, Comment, Distorting Extortion: How Bribery and Extortion Became One and the Same Under the Hobbs Act, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
285, 286 (2017).
62 Dearington, supra note 59, at 205–06.
63 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting 2 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 31:03, p. 226 (6th ed. 2008));
Dearington, supra note 59, at 207.
64 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,
64 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted); Dearington, supra note 59, at 207–08.
65 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (quoting Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64) (internal quotations omitted); Dearington, supra note 59, at 208.
58
59
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In so holding, the Court determined that the apparent victims of
extortion may also be members of the conspiracy.66
At its core, the Court stressed that even persons who are
incapable of committing a crime against themselves may still be
liable for conspiracy.67 Most importantly, the Court elaborated on
the concepts set forth in Gebardi.68 Markedly, when a “person’s
consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive
offense,” the government must establish more than just consent or
acquiescence for liability to attach.69 In essence, consent is not
enough for conspiracy.70 The shop owners here were incapable of
committing the offense themselves, but criminal liability was proper
because they “shared in the common purpose” of the kickbacks.71
The Court failed, however, to describe what “more” was
needed and how far an individual must go for the government to
properly classify him as a co-conspirator.72 Notably, though the
Court relied on the principles set forth in Gebardi, it neglected to
consider whether Congress actually intended to define the shop owners as a liable class.73 The Court seemed to misconstrue Gebardi
to suggest that immunity applied there because the woman simply
could not violate the Mann Act: a rationale fundamentally at odds
with its earlier holding.74 Critically, by failing to rely on legislative intent, the Court made a fundamental error.75 The Court did,

Id.
Dearington, supra note 59, at 208.
68 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431–32 n.4; see Dearington, supra note 59, at 212.
69 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432; Dearington, supra note 59, at 212.
70 See Haylock, supra note 61, at 288.
71 Id.
72 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432; see Dearington, supra note 59, at 212.
73 See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dearington, supra
note 59, at 213–14.
74 Dearington, supra note 59, at 214–15. As described above, the Court did
not deny the possibility that the woman charged in Gebardi could never be liable.
See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932). The holding instead only
required a showing that the woman was actually the driving force behind the violation and, if so, the government may succeed in establishing conspiracy liability.
See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 117.
75 Dearington, supra note 59, at 214. Of course, the Supreme Court is not bound
by precedent. However, the Court specifically relied on Gebardi and misapplied
the principles and understandings initially set forth, leaving conspiracy liability
in an unclear state. Id.
66
67
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however, leave future courts with a well-established presumption
that a co-conspirator need not voluntary commit the offense or
even be capable of committing it to face criminal liability.76
II.HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
After Watergate and the Vietnam War, all eyes were on the
United States.77 Public backlash related to both political and corporate corruption consequently influenced President Carter to rehabilitate the United States in the eyes of the international community.78
In doing so, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began to
investigate then-President Nixon and U.S.-based multinational companies.79 The SEC’s investigations uncovered over 400 companies
making illegal, or at the very least, suspicious, payments to foreign governments, their officials, and political parties.80 Notably,
the SEC found these payments were part of rampant bribery for
favorable business opportunities, which existed on an international scale.81 Consequently, in 1977, Congress unanimously
passed and adopted the FCPA to criminalize bribing or otherwise
providing “corrupt payments to foreign officials ....”82 From its
very inception, the FCPA was a revolutionary step in the scheme
of widespread international bribery, as the United States became
the only country to criminalize such behavior.83
As initially enacted, the FCPA allows both the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC to bring civil or criminal charges
against entities or individuals suspected of bribing foreign officials.84
The key provisions at issue for the purposes of this Note are the
anti-bribery provisions, which cover both “issuers” and “domestic
concerns.”85 Originally, this meant the FCPA targeted issuers of

Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432.
See Rediker, supra note 5, at 57.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Kevin K. Smith, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Set Aside the Moral
and Ethical Debates, How Does One Operate Within this Law?, 45 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1119, 1122 (2017).
81 See id.
82 Rediker, supra note 5, at 57.
83 Id. at 57–58.
84 Phillips, supra note 2, at 92.
85 Rediker, supra note 5, at 58.
76
77
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certain securities regulated by the SEC as well as American citizens
and corporations that arise under the laws of the United States.86
To be guilty of an FCPA violation, the law further requires a payment, offer, or gift of something of monetary value to foreign officials or political parties, or to their intermediaries, who knew or
should have known about the bribery.87
A.Key Amendments to the FCPA: Extending Its Jurisdictional
Reach
As initially implemented, the FCPA did not extend to foreign
individuals or corporations.88 Nearly a decade after the FCPA was
passed, the first amendment to the statute was introduced.89 In
1988, Congress presented the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act to “encourage the international community” to enact
similar anti-bribery legislation.90 The modified language added a
scienter requirement that was intended to extend liability to third
parties who have actual knowledge of the true intent of the payment or who have acted recklessly “with a conscious disregard for
the truth.”91 Conversely, at that time, Congress recognized that

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); Rediker, supra note 5, at 58.
Ira Handa, Fallacies in the Current Methods of Prosecuting International
Commercial Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2016). As a result of the
FCPA, corporations have developed strict compliance programs to ensure their full
submission to the FCPA. Id. at 727. These compliance programs track both the antibribery and the accounting provisions of the FCPA. See id. at 727, 743. The former
aims to prevent bribery of foreign officials; the latter ensures corporations keep “adequate records and internal audit systems.” Id. The government has instituted
these programs in hopes that they prevent companies from falsely reporting to the
SEC and the government. Id. at 743; see also Rahul Kohli, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2018). Furthermore, the FCPA is perhaps
one of the greatest risks multinational companies take on. See Garrick Apollon,
Article: FCPA Compliance Should Not ‘Cost An Arm And A Leg’: Assessing The
Potential For Enhanced Cost-Efficiency And Effectiveness For An Anti-Corruption
Compliance Program With The Implementation Of An Enterprise Legal Risk
Management Framework, 5 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 486, 489 (2017).
88 Rediker, supra note 5, at 58–59. Rediker notes that the FCPA was initially
developed to police American businesses. There was an underlying expectation
that other nations would look to the FCPA and create similar legislation that
would curb corruption on an international scale. See id.
89 Id. at 60.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 61.
86
87
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legally made payments in foreign countries were not subject to
FCPA scrutiny.92
Much to Congress’s chagrin, however, other nations failed
to follow suit.93 Thus, despite the laudable purpose, the FCPA initially placed U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage in
the international market.94 While international corporations could
secure contracts through bribery, American corporations were forced
to choose between obtaining favorable business deals and civil or
criminal liability.95 Congress resolved this issue through additional amendments to the Act, which extended the FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond just U.S. corporations and individuals to include
individuals and entities abroad.96
A decade later, in 1997, the United States participated in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention).97
At its close, thirty-four members signed a treaty pledging to adopt
anti-bribery legislation within their individual states, which
would model the standards set forth in the FCPA.98 Uniquely, the
states also agreed that all jurisdictions governed by anti-corruption legislation would be interpreted broadly, such that “extensive
physical connection to the bribery [was] not required.”99 The
OECD Convention sought to bring corporations onto the same
playing field by eliminating the competitive disadvantage U.S.based corporations had been facing for nearly twenty years.100

Id.
Sarah Routh, Tweet to Defeat Government Bribes: Limiting Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Combat Global Corporate Corruption, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625, 630 (2018).
94 Id. at 627.
95 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Kayla Feld, Controlling the Prosecution of Bribery: Applying Corporate Law Principles to Define a “Foreign Official”
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 245, 256 (2013).
96 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Barr Benyamin et al., Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2016).
97 Rediker, supra note 5, at 62.
98 Id. at 64; Routh, supra note 93, at 630–31.
99 Rediker, supra note 5 (internal quotations omitted); see also Routh, supra
note 93, at 631.
100 Routh, supra note 93, at 631.
92
93

2020]

CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA

785

Following the convention, Congress again amended the FCPA
to further extend the FCPA’s jurisdiction to non-U.S. corporations
and individuals.101 In implementing the Convention’s agreement
to adopt greater anti-bribery legislation, Congress introduced the
convention’s mandate into the FCPA.102 The amendment broadened
the definitions set forth in the FCPA. 103 Notably, the broadened
definitions included the expansion of “foreign officials” to include
international public organizations, such as the United Nations,
and their employees.104 Similarly, “the definition of ‘bribery’” now
includes payments made to secure unjust or unfair advantages.105
Perhaps the most important change, however, involved the
jurisdictional reach of the FCPA.106 Where the previous reach applied only to American citizens and corporations that used “the mails
or means of interstate commerce,” the Amendment extended the
FCPA’s reach to issuers, domestic concerns, or agents whether or
not mails or interstate commerce are used at all.107 Consequently,
the new Amendment allowed the Government to reach any actions taken by a party expressly recognized by the statute while
they were in the United States or abroad.108 Facially, the Amendment could be interpreted to apply only to acts taken in the United
States that may violate the FCPA.109 However, in practice, the
DOJ and the SEC have continued to read the FCPA’s jurisdiction
broadly by attaching liability to all foreign corporations regardless of
their connection to the United States.110 The expanded jurisdictional
scope meant that foreign agents would also be subject to prosecution for violating the FCPA.111

Rediker, supra note 5, at 62–63.
Id.
103 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Routh, supra note 93, at 631.
104 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Routh, supra note 93, at 631. Despite the increased jurisdictional scope,
foreign officials technically remained off the list of prosecutable parties under
both the FCPA and the general conspiracy law. See id. at 639.
110 Routh, supra note 93, at 631; see also Natasha N. Wilson, Pushing the
Limits of Jurisdiction over Foreign Actors Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2014).
111 Smith, supra note 34, at 1122.
101
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B.A History of FCPA Enforcement
The SEC and DOJ have sole authority to enforce the provisions of the FCPA.112 Though the language of the Act suggests
that those prosecuted must have a sufficient connection to the
United States, beginning with George W. Bush’s administration
and continuing to the present day, the SEC and DOJ have broadly
applied the statute.113 Having implemented the 1998 Amendments, agencies have had much wider discretion to prosecute
those who allegedly violate the Act both in the United States and
abroad.114 The DOJ and SEC have taken advantage of this power
by prosecuting a significantly greater number of individuals since
the FCPA’s enactment.115
From its inception until the early 2000s, the DOJ and SEC
prosecuted less than four actions each year.116 In 2010, and for
the last decade, however, the DOJ and SEC have averaged between seventy and eighty annual FCPA actions.117 In 2010 alone,
these agencies investigated seventy-four corporations and individuals, which resulted in the collection of over $1.8 billion in
fines.118 Perhaps unsurprisingly, between 1999 and 2010, the U.S.
continued to lead the OECD nations in the number of enforcement actions it pursued.119

Kohli, supra note 87, at 1272.
Rediker, supra note 5, at 54.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Routh, supra note 93, at 632; see also STANFORD LAW SCHOOL ARTHUR
AND TONI REMBE ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COLLABORATION
WITH SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-keys.html [https://perma.cc/UY8W-3N4B]
[hereinafter STANFORD LAW SCHOOL].
117 Routh, supra note 93, at 632; Emily Willborn, Extraterritorial Enforcement
and Prosecutorial Discretion in the FCPA: A Call for International Prosecutorial
Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 422, 428 (2013).
118 Willborn, supra note 117, at 428.
119 Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 303, 319 (2012). Over the
same period, the United States obtained forty-eight criminal convictions, twentyseven plea agreements, and thirty-two deferred or non-prosecution agreements.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY: 2010 DATA
ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, COMPARATIVE TABLE OF
ENFORCEMENT DATA COLLECTED FROM THE 38 PARTIES TO THE ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION, DECISIONS ON FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES FROM 1999 TO DECEMBER
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113

2020]

CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA

787

Scholars have uniformly credited the 1998 Amendments for
increased enforcement, given the Act’s expanded jurisdictional coverage to all persons, regardless of their nationality.120 While it is
true that the number of prosecutions has decreased over the last
few years, the decrease is perhaps due to a related increase in
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), as well as a general strengthening of FCPA enforcement.121 This includes a broader understanding of the FCPA’s
jurisdictional reach, international cooperation, and incentivized
disclosure to both the SEC and the government.122 Consequently,
despite the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion to investigate alleged violations of the FCPA, most cases result in settlement.123 Over time, NPAs and DPAs have become increasingly
popular because they grant corporate defendants the ability to
avoid the risk of costly litigation and harsh punishment at trial.124
With NPAs and DPAs, corporations instead have the opportunity
to settle their cases with civil fines and/or disgorgement.125
Perhaps rather strategically, the U.S. government has chosen
to use NPAs and DPAs in cases where the defendant is a foreign
individual or corporate entity.126 As a result, corporations abroad


2010, at 4 (Apr. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/39/47637707.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F5T9-N6Y5]. Additionally, there have been thirty-seven noncriminal
sanctions against individuals and forty-five noncriminal sanctions imposed on
corporations. Id.
120 Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms
of Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV.
527, 535–36 (2008); see also Klaw, supra note 119, at 320.
121 See Kohli, supra note 87, at 1273; Routh, supra note 93, at 632–33.
122 Kohli, supra note 87, at 1273; Routh, supra note 93, at 633.
123 Rediker, supra note 5, at 87.
124 Id.
125 Routh, supra note 93, at 633. Specifically, over the last forty years,
ninety-two percent of defendants settled their FCPA claims with the SEC, and
seventy-four percent of defendants settled with the DOJ following investigations that lasted an average of thirty-eight months. STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra
note 116. Importantly, thirty-five percent of all FCPA violations involve foreign
defendants. Id. Foreign corporations have settled some of the largest cases with
the United States, including a 2017 settlement of $965 million by a Swedish corporation. Richard L. Cassin, Telia Tops Our New Top Ten List (After We Do Some
Math), FCPA BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog
/2017/9/22/telia-tops-our-new-top-ten-list-after-we-do-some-math.html
[https://
perma.cc/N6A6-5SWL].
126 See Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under
International Law, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 257–58 (2015).
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tend not to challenge the FCPA’s jurisdiction, leaving the Second
Circuit in a unique position to challenge long-standing government practices.127 The tactical use of settlements has thus led to
circular statutory interpretation and enforcement, whereby the
SEC and DOJ have had wide discretion to both interpret and enforce their understanding of the FCPA without being subject to
judicial review.128 Without review and with an underdeveloped
body of case law, these agencies have seemingly stretched the
FCPA to capture illegal conduct that perhaps has no connection
to the United States at all.129 Until 2018, the DOJ and SEC had
nearly exclusive power to interpret the language of the FCPA.130
The Act’s broad language has remained virtually unchallenged leaving the SEC and DOJ with few restrictions.131 Scholars routinely critique the Act for its failure to define key terms.132
Key to this Note, the FCPA states “a foreign official” can be an
instrumentality of “any officer or employee of a foreign government,” but fails to define who can be an instrumentality.133 The
FCPA’s “lack of clarity” in this area grants prosecutors substantial power to interpret the ambiguous language of the FCPA and
has been a major concern for legal scholars and courts alike,134
but the DOJ and SEC have failed to address this confusion.135
With the large number of settlements that have occurred,
there is an unfortunate shortage of jurisprudence regarding the true
meaning and reach of the FCPA.136 This shortage is perhaps the
foundation for cases such as Hoskins, which has conceivably opened
the door for future challenges to the FCPA. As agencies continue
to enforce the FCPA, who may be charged with violations becomes
as difficult a question to answer as what must be done to ensure
compliance with the ostensibly broad-reaching statute.


Routh, supra note 93, at 633; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240.
Routh, supra note 93, at 633, 641; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240.
129 Routh, supra note 93, at 633; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240.
The broad discretion exercised by these agencies has resulted in nearly $1 billion
through settlements. Routh, supra note 93, at 641.
130 Rediker, supra note 5, at 55.
131 Routh, supra note 93, at 628.
132 Id. at 642. See Alexander G. Hughes, Drawing Sensible Borders for the Definition of “Foreign Official” Under the FCPA, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253, 256–57 (2013).
133 Hughes, supra note 132, at 256.
134 Rediker, supra note 5, at 54.
135 Hughes, supra note 132, at 256.
136 Rediker, supra note 5, at 54–55.
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C.Precedent, Conspiracy, and the FCPA: United States v. Castle
An important step in understanding the FCPA came in
1991 when the Fifth Circuit expressly examined the relationship
between conspiracy liability and the FCPA.137 Though decided before the 1998 Amendments, Castle determined the FCPA could
consistently be applied with regard to international law.138 The
Castle decision set forth ample precedent for the Second Circuit
as the first appellate decision on whether foreign officials can conspire to violate the FCPA.139
Castle involved the indictment of Canadian officials for violations of the FCPA and federal conspiracy law.140 Allegedly, a
U.S.-based company paid Canadian officials a $50,000 bribe to secure a favorable government contract.141 Relying on Gebardi, the
district court dismissed the claims and the Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed.142 As an important precursor, the court held
that foreign officials, who were the very subject of the bribes, cannot be charged for conspiring to violate the FCPA because, as the
target, they cannot themselves substantively violate the FCPA.143
Because the Canadian officials were central to the actual commission of an FCPA violation, the Fifth Circuit determined there was
“overwhelming evidence” that Congress intended to exempt foreign officials who merely received a bribe.144
As in other cases of conspiracy liability, the court drew on
legislative intent.145 Namely, the statute’s failure to expressly address the subject of the bribes led the Fifth Circuit to determine
there was an affirmative legislative policy not to punish the Canadian officials as co-conspirators.146 The court emphasized that
the Court in Gebardi “refused to disregard Congress’ intention to
exempt” a class of persons by allowing the class to be prosecuted

See generally United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1991);
Dearington, supra note 59, at 221.
138 Klaw, supra note 119, at 363.
139 Dearington, supra note 59, at 221.
140 Castle, 925 F.2d at 832.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 836.
143 Dearington, supra note 59, at 221.
144 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835.
145 Id.; Dearington, supra note 59, at 212.
146 United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007).
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under the conspiracy statute.147 Given the Gebardi principle, the
Fifth Circuit analogized the FCPA to the Mann Act.148 The court
articulated how the statutes were drafted in a similar manner,
which was indicative of congressional intent to limit the FCPA’s
reach.149 In so arguing, the court reasoned Congress understood
how far it could extend the FCPA but deliberately chose only to
penalize the active participants in the bribe.150 Consequently, to
disregard Congress’s intent to expressly limit the statute’s reach
would be to disregard binding precedent.151
In its holding, the Fifth Circuit recognized that in drafting the
FCPA, it was evident that there would be instances in which foreign
officials would accept bribes offered to them.152 Congress, however,
did not place liability on or “condemn the foreign official’s conduct
under the statute.”153 Congress instead wished merely to prosecute
and proscribe the actual conduct of bribing foreign officials by persons or entities within the United States rather than the mere acceptance of a bribe.154 It seems fair to suggest Castle interpreted
the FCPA as exhibiting congressional intent not to embarrass
“friendly [ ] governments” by punishing foreign officials for accepting bribes.155
An alternate theory, however, is merely that the Fifth Circuit
believed there was only a one-sided approach set forth in the
FCPA.156 In essence, to prosecute only those who participate in
the act of bribery regardless of the briber’s location.157 The Circuit’s
holding can thus be narrowed by attaching liability to “every possible person connected to the” bribes, except for those on the demand
side of the transaction.158 This interpretation would seem to suggest


Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222.
Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222.
149 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222.
150 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222; see also Garen
S. Marshall, Increasing Accountability for Demand-Side Bribery in International
Business Transactions, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1283, 1293 (2013).
151 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222.
152 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222.
153 Dearington, supra note 59, at 224.
154 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; Dearington, supra note 59, at 224.
155 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; see also Letter from Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary
of Commerce, to Senator William Proxmire (June 11, 1976).
156 Klaw, supra note 119, at 309; Sarah Bartle et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265, 1276 (2014).
157 See Klaw, supra note 119, at 309.
158 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; see also Marshall, supra note 150, at 1287.
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that Hoskins-like situations will not be affected because Hoskins,
as discussed below, involved a supply side transaction. While
there are clear implications for international relations if a foreign
official is prosecuted in the United States for accepting a bribe, it
is much less clear whether there are diplomatic concerns with enforcement actions against foreign participants in a U.S.-based bribery scheme.159 Thus, the question before the Second Circuit was
still a case of first impression.
Since the Circuit decided Castle, the government has widely
accepted its holding and, until recently, has not prosecuted foreign
officials for alleged FCPA violations under a theory of conspiracy
liability.160 Furthermore, in line with Castle, in 2012 the SEC and
DOJ released guidance expressly indicating “that bribe-taking
foreign officials are not liable under the general federal conspiracy statute.”161
All things considered, the question remains whether Castle
remains good law in light of the Court’s decision in Ocasio.162
While foreign officials cannot bribe themselves or commit FCPA
violations single-handedly, the Supreme Court’s precedent establishes they are not inherently barred from a conspiracy charge.163
Arguably, in examining the FCPA under the lens of Ocasio or
Gebardi, if a foreign official does more than consent or acquiesce to
the bribe, he arguably has done enough to establish co-conspirator
liability under the FCPA.164
III.UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS
A.History and District Court Opinion
United States v. Hoskins involved a citizen of the United
Kingdom, Lawrence Hoskins, employed by a U.K.-based subsidiary
of Alstom, a French multinational company.165 The DOJ alleged
Hoskins played a part in a scheme in which three Alstom executives,

See Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 460 (2009).
160 Dearington, supra note 59, at 224–25.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 225–26.
164 See id. at 227–28.
165 902 F.3d 69, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., concurring); see also United
States v. Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d 316, 318 (D. Conn. 2015).
159
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some of whom worked for Alstom’s U.S. subsidiary, bribed Indonesian officials to obtain a $118 million contract.166 The United
States government alleged that the Alstom U.S. executives met
multiple times while in the United States to discuss and further
the bribery scheme.167 Further, it was alleged that the executives
frequently communicated via phone and email.168
According to the DOJ, Alstom U.S. paid consultants to deliver the bribe to the Indonesian officials.169 Hoskins was purportedly responsible for selecting those consultants and authorizing the
payments with full knowledge of the purpose of the payments to
both influence and assist Alstom in obtaining a contract.170 To
further tie the consultants to the United States the indictment
asserted one of the consultants had a bank account in Maryland.171
Notably, Hoskins never worked for Alstom U.S. and had
never stepped foot in the United States at any point during the
Indonesian bribery scheme.172 Nonetheless, the DOJ charged
Hoskins with conspiring to violate the FCPA, aiding and abetting
an FCPA violation, and with substantive FCPA violations.173 At
trial, Hoskins moved to dismiss the conspiracy count.174 Hoskins’s
chief argument was that the DOJ could not charge him with conspiracy because he did not fall within the expressly defined categories of defendants Congress anticipated and intended would be
charged under the FCPA.175
In the alternative, the DOJ alleged Hoskins was an agent
of Alstom’s U.S. subsidiary.176 This theory centered on a number
of emails and telephone calls between Hoskins and his U.S.-based
co-conspirators.177 Therefore, the government argued, it was at

Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318.
Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
168 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
169 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318.
170 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72.
171 See id.
172 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318, 327 n.14.
173 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318–19 n.1.
174 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 317.
175 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 320.
176 CHRISTOPHER B. BRINSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10197, CAN A FOREIGN EMPLOYEE OF A FOREIGN COMPANY BE FEDERALLY PROSECUTED FOR FOREIGN
BRIBERY? 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10197.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9C
-ZAJW].
177 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
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least plausible that Hoskins could be convicted for violating the
FCPA as an accessory or co-conspirator despite lacking a physical
presence in the United States.178
In responding to the question, the district court refused to
dismiss the DOJ’s claim that Hoskins was liable as an agent.179
However, the court held that the FCPA cannot reach a non-resident
foreign national who is not an agent of a U.S. company and who
does not commit acts while physically present in the United States.180
The court consequently foreclosed the possibility of conspiracy liability.181 The district court relied on the statute’s legislative intent,
specifically finding the categories of persons expressly mentioned
in the FCPA were the only class of persons subject to the Act’s
jurisdictional reach.182 Moreover, the district court held, “Congress did not intend to impose accomplice liability on non-resident
foreign nationals who were not subject to direct liability” under
the FCPA.183 The government subsequently appealed.184
B.Second Circuit’s Affirmation
On appeal, the court addressed whether Hoskins, a foreign
national who had never entered the United States or worked for
a U.S. based company, could be held liable under conspiracy or
complicity theories for violating the FCPA.185 The Second Circuit
carefully framed the question, indicating what while Hoskins was
“incapable of committing [substantive FCPA violations] as a principal” the key issue on appeal was whether he could still be liable
as an accomplice or co-conspirator.186 In answering the question,
the Second Circuit focused on history and precedent, the legality
of conspiracy liability, the affirmative legislative policy exemption, and the presumption against extraterritorial application.187

Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 325.
Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
180 Id.
181 See id. at 327, 327 n.14.
182 Id. at 325.
183 Id. at 327.
184 Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2018).
185 Id. at 76.
186 Id.
187 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69.
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Common law has long-standing practical effects, particularly with respect to conspiracy liability.188 In particular, at common
law, one who intentionally directs or facilitates the crimes physically
executed by others is still accountable for their actions under the
laws of the United States.189 This implicit rule has since been codified to hold accountable those who may not personally commit
crimes but who “‘aid[ ], abet[ ], counsel[ ], command[ ], induce[ ]
or produce[ ] the commission of” a crime by another.190 As the Second
Circuit notes, conspiracy liability can still attach even when the person “was incapable of committing the substantive offense” himself.191
Beyond basic conspiracy liability, common law has identified an affirmative legislative policy exception.192 The exception
functions similarly to a canon of construction, considering the legislature’s intent not to extend liability to specific groups of individuals even if the statutory text requires compliance.193 Here,
both Hoskins and the government put forth their understanding
of this affirmative legislative exception, debating whether the legislative policy exception applies to the FCPA and, more specifically, whether Congress meant to extend liability.194
Notwithstanding the legislative policy exception, the Second
Circuit heavily relied on the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction.195 This presumption similarly seeks to understand
congressional intent.196 Here, the court assessed whether the
FCPA provides “a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”197 More importantly, the Second Circuit had to
determine whether the conduct in question occurred in the United
States.198 If so, the conduct may permissibly be susceptible to legal
action in the United States under the FCPA even if the conduct
occurred abroad.199

See id. at 77.
Id.
190 Id. at 77 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)).
191 Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997)).
192 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 77.
193 Id. at 77–78.
194 Id. at 78.
195 Id. at 95 (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090,
2100 (2016)).
196 Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 96–97.
199 Id.
188
189

2020]

CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA

795

All things considered, when examining the district court’s
ruling, the Circuit unanimously rejected both the DOJ’s theory of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and its broad-sweeping understanding
of jurisdiction.200 The Circuit agreed with the district court finding that Congress affirmatively excluded foreign individuals from
liability when it drafted the FCPA.201 The Circuit’s immediate affect consequently narrowed the FCPA’s reach.202
The Second Circuit, nevertheless, did reverse in part.203
The Circuit disagreed with the district court’s determination that
because Hoskins never entered the United States, he could not be
prosecuted under the FCPA.204 The court instead recognized that
if the government could prove Hoskins was an agent of a domestic
concern, he could still be liable under the FCPA for conspiring
with employees and other Alstom agents.205 It is this very holding
that may have implicit effects for future litigation.
C.Application of Precedent to United States v. Hoskins
The Second Circuit primarily relied on Gebardi and Amen
as sounding boards to define the very contours of conspiracy liability and affirmative legislative policy.206 The Circuit seemingly
accepted the Court’s ruling in Gebardi, maintaining that such liability does not exist where the legislature expresses a clear intent to leave certain classes of persons beyond the statute’s scope.207
The court stressed Gebardi’s need for “something more” for liability
to attach because congressional silence inherently acts as “a conferral of immunity.”208 The overarching need for “something more”
is, at its core, a searching examination of congressional intent,
particularly as it relates to the text of the statute.209

Id. at 97.
Id. at 74, 97.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 72.
204 Id. at 98.
205 Id. at 72.
206 Id. at 78–80.
207 Id. at 80.
208 Id. (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121–23 (1932)).
209 Libby Gerstner, Case Comment, United States v. Hoskins: An Originalist
Approach to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379,
384 (2019) (citing Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 81).
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Before ruling in Hoskins, the Second Circuit had already
established that circumventing the statute’s purpose by extending
conspiracy liability would be a disservice to legislative intent.210 In
both Amen and Hoskins, by looking at the “text of the statute and
the purpose that Congress was trying to achieve,” the Circuit reasoned it was obliged to impose congressional will in interpreting
the statute at issue.211 The Second Circuit’s use of originalism extends from Amen to Hoskins as a means of understanding and
analyzing criminal statutes in a manner that allows others to fully
escape criminal liability.212
The government proposed that Gebardi only applies if “(1)
‘the defendant’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in the [substantive] offense,’ or (2) ‘the defendant’s participation in the crime
is frequently, if not normally, a feature of the [substantive] criminal conduct.’”213 The Second Circuit, however, used Amen’s guiding principles to reject the government’s contention that Gebardi
should be narrowly read.214
In rejecting the first proposal, the court found it to be “foreclosed” under Wharton’s Rule, which prohibits liability from attaching based on the exact agreement at issue in substantive
crimes.215 Amen further supported this supposition by refusing to
extend liability to third parties who were “required for a criminal
enterprise to exist,” but who were not the subject of the statute.216
The government’s second argument failed for strikingly
similar reasons—legislative intent.217 In both Gebardi and Amen,
the statutes did not require “frequent[ ], if not normal[ ]” conduct

Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80 (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382
(2d Cir. 1987)).
211 Id. at 80–81.
212 See Gerstner, supra note 209, at 383.
213 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 81 (quoting Appellant’s Opening Br. At 24).
214 See id. at 385.
215 Id. Wharton’s Rule requires conspiracy indictments to be dismissed before trial. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 774 (1975). The rule operates
as an exception to a principle that conspiracy and the substantive offense cannot converge where two or more persons, together, commit the underlying
crime and the “immediate consequences of the crime” impact the “parties themselves rather than … society at large.” Id. at 782–83.
216 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 82 (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382
(2d Cir. 1987)).
217 Id.
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related to the criminal activity.218 Instead of focusing on frequency,
the Court required there be action or participation by the charged
party on every occasion for which there had been an alleged violation.219 Unlike the Mann Act, which had the potential to impose
liability on women for transporting themselves, the Circuit reasoned the FCPA contains no such possibility.220 Rather, the text
of the FCPA expressly identifies who is subject to the statute, and
arguably does not leave open the possibility for further extension
to others.221 According to the court, the very omission of language
that would cover a foreign official acting outside of the United States
and not on behalf of any American person or company dictates that
such a person cannot be liable.222 By considering congressional
hearings and floor debates to identify legislative intent—which
has often been critiqued as an unreliable source to determine the
statute’s intent—the court held true to its precedent.223
In the United States, it is accepted that while our laws govern
conduct on American soil, they “do[ ] not rule the world” unless
Congress has deliberately and intentionally expressed such an intent.224 In essence, the Second Circuit seemingly relied on a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.225 This
presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction that requires the court to determine whether the conduct is
domestic.226 Only where a statute expressly states its intent to
apply to “foreign matters” can the presumption be overcome.227
Importantly, as a canon of construction, the presumption is not
dispositive and cannot be considered in a vacuum.228 Assuming
the presumption has not been rebutted, the court may ascertain


Id. at 81–82.
Id.
220 Id. at 84.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 85.
223 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see
also Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641 (1990).
224 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
225 See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 95 (citing RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100–01).
226 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
227 Id.
228 Id.
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whether the conduct occurred in the United States—thereby requiring a domestic application of the law—or, alternatively, if the
alleged crime occurred abroad.229
In application, the Second Circuit determined that the presumption against extraterritorial application could not be rebutted.230 First, the FCPA was arguably clear on its territorial limits;
unless a foreign national either commits a crime within the confines
of the United States or is otherwise an agent, employee, or shareholder or an American issuer or domestic concern, liability will
not be imposed.231 Congress’s deliberate choice to exclude foreign
nationals from the Act effectively necessitated a holding that Hoskins
could not be liable under either conspiracy or complicity theories
of liability.232
Given the Second Circuit’s holding, there appears to be tension
between the Hoskins decision and Gebardi.233 By its own account, the
Second Circuit did follow its established precedent.234 In doing so,
the Circuit underscored how Amen continues to be fundamentally
at odds with Gebardi and how that has impacted its holding.235
Amen relied on the mere absence of evidence to find congressional
intent.236 The Gebardi exception, in contrast, was rather narrow,
identifying an exception only where the court could ascertain an affirmative legislative policy.237 The absence of a clear statement of
liability in Gebardi did not foreclose such accountability, and instead
meant the court must instead undergo a searching analysis for
intent.238 The cases are further distinct in that Amen relied more
on legislative history than statutory text, which the Gebardi Court
examined closely as a means to decipher the statute’s underlying
purpose.239 Despite the application of precedent in Hoskins, the
Circuit’s decision is not inherently incorrect or inconsistent with
its past decisions. Rather, and perhaps more problematic to our

Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 95 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100).
Id. at 96.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 97; see also Gerstner, supra note 209, at 387.
233 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
234 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 96.
235 See Firtash, 392 F. Supp. at 891. Compare Gebardi v. United States, 287
U.S. 112, 123 (1932), with United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1987).
236 Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.
237 Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
238 Compare Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23, with Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.
239 Compare Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123, with Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.
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understanding of the FCPA, Hoskins merely makes for continued
confusion in this area of the law.
IV.IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULING
Hoskins left the courts in a unique position for future applications of conspiracy liability and the FCPA. At this point, this
Note addresses the potential implications that the Hoskins decision will have in future FCPA investigations and litigation. The
potential effects are addressed in two parts. First, this Note will
focus on the proactive steps the government could take in an attempt to re-expand its jurisdiction or, conversely, to codify the
Second Circuit’s holding. Beyond these affirmative steps, this Note
aims to examine solutions to the Second Circuit’s restrictions on
the FCPA’s extraterritorial position. Primarily, this portion will
assess a return to agency theory in the circuits in the prosecution
of foreign individuals and companies for FCPA violations.
A.Potential for Circuit Splits and Potential Congressional Action
At present, the government has not sought a rehearing or
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. This
is perhaps not surprising, given the Second Circuit was the first to
directly address whether foreign nationals could conspire to violate
the FCPA.240 Given the FCPA’s expansive reach and the compliance
requirements set forth by the statute, it is necessary for companies
and individuals to fully understand the implications of the law.
The recency of the decision lends itself to much speculation
as to the primary effects Hoskins will have on FCPA regulations
and prosecutions. Companies have a unique and expected tendency to avoid litigation, leaving individuals to bear the weight of
prosecutions because they often have less incentive to settle their
cases.241 Consequently, the government may take new approaches to

Kimberly A. Parker et al., Second Circuit Limits Government’s Ability to
Prosecute Foreign Persons and Companies for Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA,
WILMERHALE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client
-alerts/20180828-second-circuit-limits-governments-ability-to-prosecute-foreign
-persons-and-companies-for-conspiracy-to-violate-the-fcpa [https://perma.cc/NW
Q8-55DR].
241 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116.
240
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old methods while simultaneously attempting to expand its jurisdiction over these cases.
Before Hoskins, there was already substantial confusion as
to the FCPA’s reach. Adding to the confusion in this area of the
law, the Hoskins decision inherently contravenes the DOJ and
SEC’s 2012 joint Resource Guide.242 The Guide describes the SEC
and DOJ’s stance on aiding and abetting and conspiracy, specifically in relation to the anti-bribery provisions.243 According to the
Guide, the FCPA retains jurisdiction over any conspirators so long
as one of the conspirators is “an issuer, domestic concern, or commits a reasonably foreseeable overt act” in the United States.244
By logical extension, the Resource Guide explains the SEC’s position
that “[i]ndividuals and companies, including foreign nationals and
companies, may also be liable for conspiring to violate the FCPA ...
even if they are not, or could not be, independently charged with
a substantive FCPA violation.”245 Of note, either “a foreign, nonissuer company” or an individual may be guilty for conspiracy to
engage in a substantive FCPA violation.246
Accordingly, by the agencies’ very definition and understanding of the FCPA, the Second Circuit’s decision is directly adverse
to its approach to foreign individuals.247 The holding is remarkable not only because it is contrary to long-standing agency interpretation, but also because it has subsequently narrowed the SEC
and DOJ’s reach to non-residents or foreign companies involved
in FCPA conspiracies, unless the proscribed conduct occurs in the


See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 34 (2012), https://www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ATC6-4HU8] [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. The Resource Guide was developed
for the purpose of explaining and answering some of the most pressing questions
about the FCPA including, but not limited to, the costs of corruption, the AntiBribery Provisions, and guidance on the enforcement of the FCPA. Id. at Foreword.
The Resource Guide thus serves the overarching purpose of guiding businesses in
their compliance of the basic precepts of the FCPA’s bribery and accounting provisions. Id. It is crucial to note that corporate bribery has a significant impact on
overseas business which, in a free market system, fundamentally influences the
price and quality of goods or services. Id. (quoting United States Senate, 1977).
243 Id. at 34.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See generally United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 242.
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United States.248 The Circuit’s decision to override the government’s “long-held position about the scope of the FCPA” leaves
unanswered a number of questions about the FCPA’s scope and
how the government will proceed in the future.249 Furthermore,
because FCPA violations are often not brought to trial, it becomes
unclear if or even when these questions will be addressed.250
Perhaps one of the most pressing issues is how the government will pursue future FCPA charges for foreign individuals and
corporations following Hoskins. Evidently, Hoskins is binding
precedent on the district courts within the Second Circuit and will
be persuasive to the circuit if the same issue arises. However,
while the court’s decision is persuasive to others, it does not necessarily foreclose its sister circuits from exercising their own judicial review in similar cases.251 In fact, while the Seventh Circuit
has not yet addressed the same question, its precedent has declined to impose the Hoskins approach.252
In particular, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in United States v.
Pino-Perez considered the Drug Kingpin Statute at issue in Amen.253
The case involved a drug supplier rather than the organization’s
kingpin.254 As in Amen, the defendant alleged that aiding and
abetting liability did not and in fact could not apply.255 The Seventh
Circuit specifically rejected Amen’s reliance on legislative history
and instead explained that liability attaches automatically through
the conspiracy statute, indicating that congressional intent should
not be the key to a court’s decision on liability.256 Only in a limited
number of circumstances are individuals immune from liability as
an aider and abettor.257 The Circuit continued, stating that only

See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 69; RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 242.
Second Circuit Decision Limits FCPA Jurisdiction as to Foreign Nationals
Outside the United States, O’MELVENY (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.omm.com/re
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-4UJ2].
250 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116.
251 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
252 Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 891.
253 See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1231 (7th Cir. 1989).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1233.
256 Id. at 1234.
257 Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 891; see also Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1234.
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in those specifically defined circumstances may a court determine
that Congress intended to shield accomplices from liability.258
Thus, there is a possibility that the DOJ or SEC will pursue
conspiracy charges in these sister circuits in the hopes of reaching
a contrary result. Should the agencies make such a decision, the
circuits will either agree with the government’s expansive view of
the FCPA or find the Second Circuit’s logic more persuasive. If the
government attempts to expand the FCPA through further court
cases, there is increased potential for circuit splits and a much
greater likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari. However, because most FCPA actions are settled, it seems unlikely that
there will be an increase in cases to create a circuit split.259 Practically, a potential split would take some time to come to fruition.260
Hoskins and the aforementioned cases in this Note were
based on the deliberate intent of Congress.261 It is more likely that,
given the importance of statutory construction and interpretation
in the above cases, the government will hone in on the possibility
of future congressional action.262 The Second Circuit understood
that at common law, “persons who intentionally direct or facilitate the crimes physically executed by others must be held accountable for their actions” and “this recognition was effectuated


in the following circumstances. First, if the crime is defined so as to require more
than one person for its commission so as to render the second participant a principal
rather than an aider and abettor. See Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 890. Second,
if the participant is the victim of the crime, he cannot be an aider and abettor.
Id. Lastly, if the participant is part of the class the statute is designed to protect,
that participant is also not an aider and abettor. Id. (citing Gebardi v. United
States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932)).
258 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1234.
259 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116.
260 Kara Brockmeyer et al., Second Circuit Curbs FCPA Application to Some
Foreign Participants in Bribery, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 6–7 (Aug. 2018), https://
www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2018/08/fcpa%20update
_august%202018_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4SZ-7DGC]; United States v. Hoskins—
Second Circuit Rejects DOJ’s Attempt to Expand the Extraterritorial Reach of the
FCPA Through Conspiracy and Complicity Doctrines, SULLIVAN CROMWELL 1, 4
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-Second
-Circuit-Limits-Extraterritorial-Reach-of-FCPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y9Q-YE
TJ] [hereinafter SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION].
261 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423; Gebardi,
287 U.S. 112; Amen, 831 F.2d 373.
262 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423; Gebardi,
287 U.S. 112; Amen, 831 F.2d 373.
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by developing the doctrines of conspiracy.”263 However, there remain
exceptions to common law and the reach of the conspiracy statute.264
In Hoskins, Judge Pooler argued:
Accepting Gebardi’s teaching that conspiracy and complicity liability will not lie when Congress demonstrates an affirmative
legislative policy to leave some type of participant in a criminal
transaction unpunished, the question becomes how to identify
such a policy.... [W]e cannot identify such a policy whenever a
statute focuses on certain categories of persons at the exclusion
of others ... In both [Gebardi and Amen] the courts looked to
the text of the statute and the purpose that Congress was trying
to achieve thereby honoring their “over-arching obligation to give
effect to congressional intent” when interpreting statutes.265

Put more simply, where Congress deliberately identifies
which class of individuals will be liable, courts cannot read in
other classes to extend liability.266 Similarly, Judge Lynch in his
concurrence expressed concern that allowing courts to “read in”
their own interpretation of the law, despite what is plainly stated,
goes against the very “obligation[s]” courts have to “honor[ ]” Congress.267 This very principle consequently opens the door for congressional action.268
Judge Lynch continued, stating his belief that the Hoskins
result seems “questionable as a matter of policy.”269 Judge Lynch
dove deeper into congressional intent than Judge Pooler by focusing
on the actual purpose of the law.270 He reasoned the purpose was
to avoid perpetuating crimes under the FCPA while also respecting
the sovereignty of the foreign countries involved.271 Consequently,
these purposes are not hindered by attaching conspiracy liability
to persons who are not physically present in the United States or
who are not necessarily depicted in the statute’s plain text.272


Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 77.
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As a result, while Judge Lynch agreed with the textual reading of the statute, he seemed troubled by the possibility that a person
who was a member of “the team that reached the United States”
could not be found to have conspired with the U.S. subsidiary to perpetuate FCPA violations.273 There is a distinct difference between
the concept of agency and the actions of “instructors.”274 That is,
agency requires a person to act on behalf of another, and therefore
acts as an extension of the principal.275 Conversely, instructors
teach and guide others to proper practice or study.276 This inevitable distinction proves concerning and allows individuals to act
under the guise of an instructor to avoid criminal liability.277 This
creates an incentive for multinational corporations to “instruct”
individuals rather than to expressly identify agents.278
The potential problems arising from the Second Circuit’s
decision invites Congress to amend the FCPA again.279 Presumably,
Congress may choose to expand liability beyond the groups expressly included in the statute.280 The success of such an amendment, however, seems unlikely given President Trump’s previous
comments that the FCPA makes “it difficult for U.S. companies to
compete overseas.”281 Similarly, in 2012, President Trump called for
a change to the law, and enforcement under the FCPA appears to
be declining despite officials in the administration claiming that
they are “committed to enforcing it.”282 Given the apparent decline
in enforcement proceedings under the FCPA and the President’s
stance, it seems unlikely that any real changes will be made to the
law in the near future.283
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B.The Implications of Hoskins on Attaching Agency Theory to
Foreign Officials
Moving beyond affirmative actions that the government
may take, there are more practical implications that may occur as a
result of the Hoskins decision. Legal scholars have suggested that
the scope of the decision may impact only a rather small portion
of cases.284 These theories exist primarily because individuals and
corporations that have previously been guilty for violating the
FCPA have been found to do so under traditional agency theories.285
While agency theory may provide valid insights into current FCPA
enforcement provisions, agency has rarely—if ever—been used to
apply liability to foreign individuals or companies that exist in a
space “unreachable” by the FCPA’s jurisdictional bounds.286
Hoskins established that only those foreign officials who are
“agents, employees, officers, directors, or shareholders of an American issuer of domestic concern” may be liable for violations of the
FCPA.287 Though the Second Circuit determined that Hoskins
could not be liable for conspiring, the court did not foreclose the
possibility of liability upon a sufficient showing of agency.288 This
holding created a fundamental hole in the FCPA doctrine. This
decision ensures, without question, that a foreign national must
be an agent of an American company to attach conspiracy and
complicity liability, though the court refused to express just how
a person could be an agent of domestic concern.289
Consequently, the Second Circuit’s decision in Hoskins will
likely have spillover effects into agency theory as the DOJ and
SEC attempt to indict foreign individuals engaged in conduct violative of the FCPA.290 An agent acts on behalf of another—the
principal—and is subject to the principal’s control.291 An agency
relationship creates a basic fiduciary obligation as a principal
“manifests assent to another,” the agent, to “act on the principal’s
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behalf and subject to the principal’s control,” and the agent provides his consent to such actions.292 Scholars have debated the
certainty of agency theory and have, at times, considered agency
to be a vague standard.293
The government, however, often “takes an expansive view
of ... agency” when it prosecutes FCPA violations.294 Currently,
the SEC and DOJ do engage in prosecutions under agency theory
for violations of the FCPA.295 Multinational companies, in particular, engage in actions that open themselves up to agency liability
under the FCPA more frequently than individuals or other nationally based companies.296 These companies often open themselves up to liability by employing third parties to work on their
behalf.297 Companies are thereby required, under their fiduciary
duty of loyalty, to monitor the actions of the third parties or otherwise be subject to FCPA liability.298
Consequently, it is possible that the government will try to
broaden its basic definition of agency to hold foreign individuals
and companies who allegedly conspired or aided in violations of
the FCPA.299 Shifting from conspiracy to agency will inherently
avoid the effects of the Second Circuit’s decision and perhaps provide stronger grounds for FCPA prosecution.300 The Second Circuit
did not fully answer whether Hoskins could be tried as an agent
of the Alstom U.S. subsidiary, thus leaving the door open for the
government to engage in similar indictments later.301 Should the
government pursue Hoskins or other foreign individuals or companies under this theory, the contours of agency may begin to be
more clearly delineated.302
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While it is clear that conspiracy claims are no longer viable
for persons that are not considered agents and who have not
stepped foot in the United States, agency is inherently broad and
fact-specific, hinging on matters of control and the scope of employment.303 Factual specificity is key in these determinations,304
and it remains to be seen how individuals in Hoskins’s position
can be deemed agents of U.S. issuers or domestic concerns. Determining the true impacts of such theories will inevitably fall on
later courts, including the Second Circuit, to determine at what
point a foreign individual or corporate entity becomes an agent
and can therefore be liable under the FCPA.
Specifically, Hoskins may result in implications for joint
ventures as a matter of agency theory. “Few laws pose greater
risks to multinational businesses than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”305 For businesses, this means strict compliance, whistleblowing where necessary, and ensuring that all cross-border
engagements are up to par with the requirements of the law.306
Joint ventures, in particular, are “high-risk” engagements that “come
with a myriad of anti-bribery compliance challenges.”307 When engaging in joint ventures, issuers and businesses in the United
States have reason to fear being tagged with vicarious liability for
the actions of their international partners.308 This concern primarily comes from the definitional “fluid[ity]” of joint ventures.309
Based in contract, they may be characterized in a variety of ways,
taking on a variety of risks, control, and everything in between “an
arm’s length deal and a full merger.”310
Under the FCPA, joint ventures have traditionally been
targeted through agency.311 Agency liability traditionally attaches
vicariously to joint ventures based on the actions of venture partners
who act on behalf of the joint venture.312 The primary concern is
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thus the extent of control the “parent” has over the persons engaging
in the transaction.313 The Resource Guide does not mention any
strict expectations or liability beyond stating that an issuer is responsible for ensuring that its subsidiaries, which may include
joint ventures, comply with all FCPA provisions.314 More succinctly, issuers in the United States may therefore be liable for
the acts of their subsidiaries or joint venture partners where they
“authorize, direct, or control” such persons’ activity.315 Consequently, investors and companies engaging in these joint ventures should evaluate the risks involved in pursuing the venture
in light of strict FCPA requirements.316
Despite the typical risks involved in joint ventures, the Second Circuit’s decision in Hoskins may actually prove to be beneficial for foreign companies doing business with U.S. companies via
joint ventures.317 History recognizes the likelihood of attaching
agency theory to joint ventures, but history also puts forth evidence that conspiracy charges have been used to attach liability
in circumstances that would now otherwise be inappropriate under Hoskins.318 Before Hoskins, for example, the government attached conspiracy liability to “actions involving Marubeni, JGC
Corporation, and Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. in connection
with the TSKJ joint ventures.”319 These cases involved foreign
companies participating in transnational joint ventures.320 Working with these transnational companies leads to a variety of risks,
including increased FCPA exposure.321
The Hoskins decision suggests that foreign businesses associating with domestic issuers or concerns may now have stronger
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defenses if charged as coconspirators to FCPA violations.322 Without application of agency theory in the case of the TSKJ joint ventures, for example, multinational businesses now face less risk, so
long as they avoid authorizing or controlling conduct of joint venture partners.323
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hoskins may
have several implications for future enforcement of the FCPA. Perhaps most notably, should the SEC and DOJ choose to pursue further litigation to create a circuit split, it could result in a grant of
certiorari by the Supreme Court. It is more likely, however, that
the government will seek to attach liability under basic agency
theory. While most cases are privately settled, it is likely that the
government will seek to further ascertain the reach of its power
to prevent foreign corruption and bribery.324 Nonetheless, at present, the practical implications are yet to be seen but will perhaps
be far-reaching. Overall, Hoskins provides another example of
courts rejecting pleas to expand jurisdictional liability in cases
where Congress has not explicitly intended.325 In so doing, the
Second Circuit potentially “jeopardizes the government’s ability
to charge foreign companies and individuals.”326 As it stands today,
foreign persons who do not take action on U.S. soil or who act independently, but who have conspired to promote FCPA violations,
are virtually untouchable by the U.S. government.327
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